# Infrastructure Hunting Challenge Coin

Please sign-up for the below accounts use a personal or work email

Shodan – <u>www.shodan.io</u> Virustotal – <u>www.virustotal.com</u> URLScan – <u>www.urlscan.io</u>







# Bridewell

**Cyber Security. Where it Matters.** 

Malicious Infrastructure Tracking CTF




## **Indicators of Attack (IoA)**

## **Current Industry Standard**

Indicators of Compromise (IoC) resulting from incidents and identifying patterns of malicious activity, which is often reactive and only detects C&C infrastructure known to be malicious.

## **Bridewell CTI Approach**

This proactive approach is more effective at identifying emerging threats known as Indicators of Attack (IoA) and allows for faster responses to security breaches.




## **Detection Robustness**

Payloads, files, infrastructure and tools can be replaced, with an increasing degree of difficulties, but human behavior is difficult to change.

The "Pyramid of Pain", developed in 2013 by David J Bianco is a key conceptual model for the effective use of Cyber Threat Intelligence within Cyber Security.

- At the bottom of the pyramid are the elements that can easily be changed, with very little annoyance to a threat actor.
- Threat intelligence can prioritise indicators at the top of the pyramid to ensure detection is robust.
- Indicators of Attack (IoA) are harder for the adversary to change and often persist for longer.



## Threat Actor Disruption Through Research

Reconnaissance 10 techniques	Resource Development 8 techniques	Initial Access 10 techniques	Execution 14 techniques	Persistence 20 techniques	Privilege Escalation 14 techniques	Defense Evasion  44 techniques	Credential Access 17 techniques	Discovery 32 techniques	Lateral Movement 9 techniques	Collection 17 techniques	Command and Control 18 techniques	Exfiltration 9 techniques	Impact 14 techniques
Active Scanning (3)	Acquire Access	Content Injection	Cloud Administration	Account Manipulation (7)	Abuse Elevation	Abuse Elevation Control	Adversary-in-the- Middle (4)	II Account Discovery (4)	Exploitation of Remote Services	Adversary-in-the- Middle (4)	Application Layer Protocol (5)	Automated Exfiltration (1)	Account Access Removal
Gather Victim Host Information <sub>(4)</sub>	Acquire Infrastructure (8)	Drive-by Compromise  Exploit Public-Facing		BITS Jobs	Access Token Manipulation (5)	II Access Token Manipulation (5)	II Brute Force (4)	Application Window Discovery  Browser Information Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Archive Collected	Communication Through Removable	Data Transfer Size	Data Destruction (1)
Gather Victim Identity Information (3)	Compromise Accounts (3)	Application	Interpreter (11)  Container Administration	Boot or Logon II Autostart	Account	BITS Jobs	Credentials from Password Stores (6)	Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Data (3)  Audio Capture	Media	Exfiltration Over	Impact
Gather Victim Network	Compromise Infrastructure (8)	External Remote Services	Command  Deploy Container	Execution (14)  Boot or Logon	Manipulation (7)  Boot or Logon	Build Image on Host  Debugger Evasion	Exploitation for Credential Access	Cloud Service Dashboard	Remote Service Session Hijacking (2)	Automated Collection	Content Injection  Data Encoding (2)	Alternative Protocol (3)	Data Manipulation (3)      Defacement (2)
Gather Victim Org	Develop Capabilities (4)	Hardware Additions	Exploitation for Client	Initialization Scripts (5)	Autostart Execution (14)		Forced Authentication	Cloud Service Discovery	Remote Services (8)	Browser Session Hijacking	Data Obfuscation (3)	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	II Disk Wipe (2)
Information (4)  Phishing for Information (4)	Establish Accounts (3)	Phishing (4)	Execution Inter-Process	Browser Extensions  Compromise Host	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5)	Information  Deploy Container	Forge Web	Cloud Storage Object Discovery  Container and Resource	Replication Through Removable Media	Clipboard Data	Dynamic Resolution (3)	Exfiltration Over  Other Network	Endpoint Denial of
Search Closed Sources (2)	Obtain Capabilities (7)	Replication Through Removable Media	Communication (3)	Software Binary	. (-)	Direct Volume Access	Credentials (2)  Input Capture (4)	Discovery	Software Deployment Tools	Data from Cloud Storage	Encrypted Channel (2)	Medium (1)	Service (4) Financial Theft
Search Open Technical Databases (5)	Stage Capabilities (6)	Supply Chain Compromise (3)	Native API  Scheduled Task/Job (5)	Create Account (3)	System Process (5)  Domain or Tenant	Domain or Tenant Policy Modification (2)	Modify  Mothentication	Debugger Evasion  Device Driver Discovery	Taint Shared Content	Data from Configuration Repository (2)	Fallback Channels	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium (1)	Firmware Corruption
Search Open		Trusted Relationship	Serverless Execution	System Process (5)	Policy Modification (2)	II Execution Guardrails (2)	Process (9)	Domain Trust Discovery	Use Alternate II Authentication	Data from Information	Hide Infrastructure	Exfiltration Over Web Service (4)	Inhibit System Recovery
Websites/Domains (3) Search Victim-Owned Websites		Valid Accounts (4)	Shared Modules	Event Triggered Execution (17)	Escape to Host  Event Triggered	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Multi-Factor Authentication Interception	File and Directory Discovery	Material (4)	Repositories (5)  Data from Local System	Ingress Tool Transfer	Scheduled Transfer	Network Denial of Service (2)
Scarcii Victiii Owned Websites			Software Deployment Tools	External Remote Services	Execution (17)	File and Directory Permissions Modification (2)	Multi-Factor	Group Policy Discovery		,	Non-Application Layer	Transfer Data to Cloud Account	Resource Hijacking (4)
			System Services (2)  User Execution (3)		Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	II Hide Artifacts (12)	Authentication Request Generation	Log Enumeration  Network Service Discovery			Protocol  Non-Standard Port		Service Stop  System
			Windows Management	Implant Internal Image	Hijack Execution Flow (13)	Hijack Execution Flow (13)	Network Sniffing	Network Share Discovery		Media	Protocol Tunneling		Shutdown/Reboot
			Instrumentation	Modify Authentication Process (9)	II Process Injection (12)	Impair Defenses (11)	OS Credential Dumping (8)	Network Sniffing		Data Staged (2)  II Email Collection (3)	II Proxy (4)		
				Office Application Startup (6)	Scheduled Task/Job (5)	II Indicator Removal (10)	Steal Application Access Token	Password Policy Discovery		(9)	Remote Access Software		
				Power Settings	Valid Accounts (4)	Indirect Command Execution	Steal or Forge Authentication	Peripheral Device Discovery  Permission Groups		Screen Capture	II Traffic Signaling (2)	]	
				Pre-OS Boot (5)		Masquerading (10)	Certificates	Discovery (3)		Video Capture	II Web Service (3)		
				Scheduled Task/Job (5)		Modify Authentication Process (9)	Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets (5)	Process Discovery  Query Registry					
				Server Software		Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure (5)	Steal Web Session Cookie	Remote System Discovery					
						Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy	Unsecured Credentials (8)	II Software Discovery (1)					
			CT			Modify Registry	(0)	System Information Discovery					

Modify System Image (2)

nformation (14)

Plist File Modification

Process Injection (12)

Reflective Code Loading

Roque Domain Controller

II Pre-OS Boot (5)

Network Boundary Bridging (1)
Obfuscated Files or

stem Network
onfiguration Discovery (2)

System Network Connections

System Owner/User Discovery


System Service Discovery

Virtualization/Sandbox

System Time Discovery

THREAT ACTORS HAVE OPTIONS;)


## Threat Actor Disruption Through Research



System Service Discovery


II Pre-OS Boot (5)

## **Threat Actor Disruption Through Research**



## **Malicious Infrastructure Pivots**

## **Malicious Network Infrastructure**



## Tools





























# Bridewell

# Infrastructure Hunting Examples



Cyber Consulting



Managed Security



Penetration Testing



Data Privacy



## **Cybercrime – RATs**

#### **Overview**

AsyncRAT is an open-source Remote Access Trojan (RAT) designed for stealthy remote administration of compromised systems. It allows attackers to persist on infected machines, exfiltrate data, and execute commands through an encrypted C2 connection. It is used by threat actors, including cybercriminals and APT groups, to facilitate espionage, ransomware deployment, and credential theft.

### **Key Capabilities**

- Remote Control
- Stealth & Persistence
- Keylogging & Credential Theft
- Encrypted C2 Communication
- Clipboard Hijacking



## **Cybercrime – RATs**

## **AsyncRAT**

The AsyncRAT default configuration contains a fingerprint within the SSL certificates that can be used to profile the C2.

#### TOTAL RESULTS

49

#### TOP COUNTRIES



Netherlands	18
United States	11
Poland	5
Germany	4
France	3

More...

#### TOP PORTS

4444	12
444	9



#### Product Spotlight: We've Launched a new

45.154.98.68

45.154.98.68.powered.by.rd p.sh

1337 Services GmbH

Netherlands, Lelystad



Issued By:

I- Common Name:

AsyncRAT Server

Issued To:

|- Common Name:


AsyncRAT Server

Supported SSL Versions:


TLSv1

45.138.16.236

1337 Services GmbH







Issued By:

|- Common Name:

AsyncRAT Server

Issued To:

|- Common Name:

AsyncRAT Server

Supported SSL Versions:

TLSv1



# Cybercrime – RATs

**Shodan rule:** 

ssl:"AsyncRAT Server"

→ Shodan

18

11

5

3

12

9

TOTAL RESULTS

TOP COUNTRIES

Netherlands

**United States** 

Poland

Germany

France

More...

TOP PORTS

4444

444

49

ssl:"AsyncRAT Server"

Q.

## Product Spotlight: We've Launched a new

#### 45.154.98.68

45.154.98.68.powered.by.rd p.sh

1337 Services GmbH

Netherlands, Lelystad

2 self-signed

△ SSL Certificate

Issued By:


I- Common Name:
AsyncRAT Server

Issued To:

AsyncRAT Server

Supported SSL Versions:


TLSv1



1337 Services GmbH

Poland, Warsaw





Issued By:

|- Common Name:

AsyncRAT Server

Issued To:

|- Common Name:

AsyncRAT Server

Supported SSL Versions:

TLSv1



#### **Overview**

Offensive security tools (OST), originally developed for legitimate purposes such as penetration testing and red teaming, are increasingly being misused by various threat actors including both Cybercriminals and Nation-state actors.

**Cobalt Strike:** A red-team tool repurposed by threat actors for stealthy C2, payload delivery, and lateral movement.

**Sliver:** An open-source C2 framework with modular implants, multiple C2 channels, and strong evasion tactics.

**Metasploit:** A penetration testing framework used for exploitation, privilege escalation, and payload deployment.





ssl.cert.subject.cn:"multiplayer" ssl.cert.issuer.cn:"operators"

Q

#### Sliver

There are numerous Sliver servers deployed globally some using default configurations.

One way we have consistently tracked Sliver is by combining both server and certificate characteristics such as SSL JARM, HTTP header content etc.

#### 194.233.73.173

vmi1243780.contabo server.net

Contabo Asia Private Limited

6

Singapore, Singapore

Issued By:
|- Common Name:
operators

Issued To:
|- Common Name
multiplayer

8.210.236.220

Alibaba Cloud (Singapore) Private Limited

Hong Kong, Hong Kong

cloud

## 

Issued By:

|- Common Name: operators

Issued To:

|- Common Name: multiplayer SSL Error: TLSV1\_ALERT\_PROTOCOL\_VERSION

### **Hunt Rules:**

ssl.cert.subject.cn:"multiplayer" ssl.cert.issuer.cn:"operators"

ssl:"multiplayer" ssl:"operators"

SSL Error: TLSV1 ALERT PROTOCOL VERSION

#### TOTAL RESULTS

430

#### TOP COUNTRIES



United States	110
Germany	43
Hong Kong	43
Netherlands	41
China	27
More	

## TOP PORTS


31337	427
8443	2



## Metasploit

There are a couple of options to track the default Metasploit configuration.


It is possible to leverage both the Favicon hash and certificate information to track these servers.



## Metasploit

By using the public GitHub repository, we can search for a favicon icon to understand whether this could be used to track the server.

The hash of the favicon can then be used to search in tools like Shodan for websites that may also have the same favicon.





ssl:"MetasploitSelfSignedCA"

Q

### **Metasploit Hunt Rules:**

The SSL common name can also be used to identify Metasploit servers

ssl:"MetasploitSelfSignedCA

#### **Favicon icon:**

http.favicon.hash:-127886975







Rapid7

Versions: TLSv1.2

Supported SSL

HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2025 18:02:10 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Transfer-Encoding: chunked Connection: keep-alive Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=631138519 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self';

#### TOTAL RESULTS

313

#### TOP COUNTRIES



United States	76
Germany	51
Hong Kong	23
France	18
United Kingdom	18

#### More...

#### TOP PORTS

3790	311
3780	1



cobalt strike

Q

#### **Cobalt Strike**

There are numerous Cobalt Strike servers deployed globally some using default, and others with custom configurations.

One way we have consistently tracked Cobalt Strike is by combining both server and certificate characteristics such as SSL JARM, HTTP header content etc.

118.31.0.235

Aliyun Computing Co., LTD

China, Hangzhou

self-signed

Issued By:

|- Common Name:

|- Organization:

Issued To:

|- Common Name:

|- Organization:

Supported SSL Versions:

TLSv1.2, TLSv1.3

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found

Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2025 06:21:13 GMT

Content-Type: text/plain

Content-Length: 0

Cobalt Strike Beacon:

x86:

beacon\_type: HTTPS
cfg\_caution: 1

dns-beacon.strategy\_fail\_seconds: -1

dns-beacon.strategy\_fail\_x: -1

dns-beacon.strategy\_rotate\_seconds: -1...

2025-09-04T05:48:34.447978

2025-09-04T06:21:14.080768

8.148.194.157 🗹

Aliyun Computing Co.LTD

🍱 China, Guangzhou

cloud

self-signed

Issued By:

- Common Name:

jquery.com

|- Organization:

jQuery

Issued To:

I- Common Name:

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found

Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2025 05:48:34 GMT

Server: Apache Content-Length: 0

Keep-Alive: timeout=10, max=100

Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/plain

**Bridewell** 

#### **Cobalt Strike**

The raw data tab in Shodan can be used to grab the JARM and HTTP header information to form more complex rules.

23.94.59.4

23-94-59-4-host.colocr ossing.com drive-microsoft.top www.drive-microsoft.to

RackNerd LLC

United

23.94.59.4

Regular View >\_ Raw Data 5 Timeline



⊕ cert: { ... },

⊕ chain: [ /\* 1 item \*/ ],

the chain sha256: [ /\* 1 item \*/ ],

⊕ cipher: { ... },

⊕ dhparams: { ... },

handshake\_states: [ /\* 12 items \*/ ],

ja3s: "fef5599f0a3662839aeb1f3c854eba06",

jarm: "07d14d16d21d21d00042d41d00041d47e4e0ae17960b2a5b4fd6107fbb0926",

#### ← SSL Certificate

Issued By:

|- Organization:

CloudFlare, Inc.

Issued To:

|- Common Name:

CloudFlare Origin

Certificate

|- Organization:

CloudFlare, Inc.

Supported SSL

Versions:

TLSv1.2, TLSv1.3

Diffie-Hellman

Fingerprint:

RFC2409/Oakley

Group 2

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found

Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2025 19:05:00 GMT

Content-Type: text/plain

Content-Length: 0

# Bridewell

# Infrastructure Hunting Challenge



Cyber Consulting



Managed Security



Penetration Testing



Data Privacy



# Mission Briefing: Operation Shadow Trace (Hunt. Expose. Defend.)

You are part of Sentinel Security Research, an elite cyber intelligence unit tasked with tracking and exposing the world's most dangerous threat actors.

#### **Your Mission**

The UK's Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) is under attack. Use OSINT sources to **uncover adversary-controlled infrastructure**. Correlate data to reveal hidden threat actor footprints. Map out malicious infrastructure before the next attack occurs.

#### **Your Tools:**


URLscan.io, Shodan.io, Virustotal.com, Abuse.ch, Google ©

#### **The Reward**

The top-performing analysts will **win an exclusive**Challenge Coin a symbol of cyber threat hunting excellence.

The clock is ticking. The future of UK CNI depends on you. Get ready. Gear up. Hunt the adversary !!!





# **Logging In**

# Use your table number for username and password:

E.G.

Username = table1

Password = table1





https://cni-ctf.com/login

Please sign-up and use the below tools to solve questions:

Shodan – <u>www.shodan.io</u> Virustotal – <u>www.virustotal.com</u> URLScan – <u>www.urlscan.io</u>

# Bridewell

**Cyber Security. Where it Matters.** 

Find out how Bridewell can transform and protect your organisation's critical business functions through our modern cyber security services.

**(** +44 (0)3308 285 880

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www.bridewell.com

